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Introduction 
This paper provides an introduction to the issue of multiple discrimination and the 
problems it presents in law. It analyses how the law in many European countries deals 
with cases of multiple discrimination. It will discuss the GendeRace Project, a project 
which aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of racial discrimination laws in a gender 
perspective, and some of its findings.1  
 
This paper will also examine some alternative ways of addressing multiple 
discrimination in law and will give examples of good practice, some of which are based 
on the findings of the GendeRace project. The focus of the lessons that can be learned 
from these examples will be on the European Union level. 
 
Before the above is discussed, the term ‘multiple discrimination’ will be defined. 
Definitions of Multiple discrimination 
In the last decade or so, the idea of discrimination taking place on more than one ground 
has come to the fore in the socio-legal literature where the term ‘intersectionality’ is 
commonly used.2 The term ‘intersectionality’ was first used in this context by 
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 See, for example, Ashiagbor, D. (1999) ‘The Intersection between Gender and ‘Race’ in the Labour 
Market: Lessons for Anti-Discrimination Law’, in: Morris, A. and O’Donnell, T. (eds), Feminist 
Perspectives in Employment Law (London: Cavendish); Makkonen, T. (2002) Multiple, Compound and 
Intersectional Discrimination: Bringing the Experiences of the Most Marginalized to the Fore, available 
on line at: http://www.abo.fi/instut/imr/norfa/timo.pdf ; Hannett, S. (2003) ‘Equality at the Intersections: 
The Legislative and Judicial Failure to Tackle Multiple Discrimination’, 23, 1, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 65-86; Verloo, M. (2006) ‘Multiple Inequalities, Intersectionality and the European Union’, 13, 3, 
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and Herman, D. (eds) (2009) Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location 
(London/New York: Routledge/Cavendish); Schiek, D. and Chege, V. (eds) (2009) European Union Non-
Discrimination Law. Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional Equality Law (Abingdon: Routledge 
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Kimberlee Crenshaw in an article in 19893 to explain the specific discrimination 
experienced by black women.4 The term ‘multiple discrimination’ is another term used 
in this context, for example, within the EU,5 although intersectionality is used there as 
well, sometimes together with multiple discrimination.6 However, the terms are not 
always explained clearly and especially the term ‘multiple discrimination’ can refer to a 
number of different meanings. Generally, three types are identified in the literature.7 
 
The first type of multiple discrimination takes place where a person suffers from 
discrimination on several grounds, but each incidence of discrimination takes place on 
one ground at a time. So, for example, a disabled woman is passed over for promotion 
at work because she is a woman and a man is promoted instead (sex discrimination). 
Then, at a different time, the same woman is refused access to a restaurant because she 
is in a wheelchair (disability discrimination). Thus, the discrimination takes place on the 
basis of several grounds operating separately and at different times. Sometimes the term 
multiple discrimination is used for this specific form of discrimination only.  
 
The second type of multiple discrimination takes place where a person is discriminated 
against on more than one ground in the same instance and discrimination on the one 
ground adds to the discrimination on the other ground to create an added burden. So, 
one ground gets compounded by one or more other grounds. An example taken from the 
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British case law is the case of Perera v Civil Service Commission.8 Here, Mr Perera 
applied for a job for which the employer had set out a number of requirements. Mr 
Perera was turned down because of a variety of factors, including his experience in the 
UK, his command of English, his nationality and his age. The lack of one factor did not 
prevent him from getting the job, although it made it less likely. The lack of two factors 
decreased his chances still further. Another example is where a police department has a 
minimum height requirement for job applicants which disproportionately affects 
women. It also requires applicants to do a written test which would disproportionately 
affect people from a different ethnic origin. A woman from a different ethnic origin 
would thus experience a double disadvantage and this would constitute indirect 
discrimination on both gender and race.9 This type of multiple discrimination is often 
referred to as compound, additive or cumulative discrimination.  
 
The third type of multiple discrimination is referred to as intersectional discrimination 
and takes place where two or more grounds of discrimination interact and 
discrimination takes place because of this interaction. A good example is the following: 
a driving school does not want to employ older women as driving instructors. The 
school does employ younger women and younger and older men. An older woman who 
is turned down for a job as driving instructor complains about discrimination on the 
grounds of sex and age. The driving school can show that it employs women, so there is 
no sex discrimination; and that it employs older people, so there is no age 
discrimination. Only when both grounds are taken together, discrimination can be said 
to occur and the woman in this case would thus not succeed in bringing a case under 
either of the single grounds.10 The discrimination which takes place cannot be captured 
wholly by looking at discrimination on one ground only or each ground separately.  
 
However, it is not always easy to distinguish between the different forms of multiple 
discrimination, especially between additive and intersectional discrimination. See, for 
example, the following case which was decided on by the Dutch Equal Treatment 
Commission.11 A blind, ethnic minority woman applied for a job. As part of the 
application process, candidates had to take a written test. Because the woman was blind 
and thus could not do a written test, the company offered her an oral test instead. Based 
on the results of the test, the organisation did not offer her a job as receptionist or an 
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administrative job, but offered her work in the production department instead. The 
woman argued that she should have been allowed to take a test in Braille. She was 
disadvantaged because, as a non-native speaker, it was more difficult to take an oral test 
than a written test. She argued that this amounted to discrimination on the ground of 
disability and/or ethnicity. The Commission found discrimination on the ground of 
disability because the organisation had not made reasonable accommodation – 
providing the test in Braille did not lead to undue hardship, as the organisation agreed - 
and discrimination on the ground of race or ethnicity. The heading to the full judgment 
mentions ‘intersection’, and the judgment itself refers to a running together or 
coincidence of grounds. But is this intersectional or additive discrimination? Does the 
discrimination take place because of the interaction of disability and ethnicity or is the 
adverse effect of being disabled compounded by the fact the woman was not a native 
Dutch speaker? It is suggested that both could be argued and we come back to this later, 
when we discuss the way courts and equality bodies deal with cases of multiple 
grounds. 
 
 The above shows that it is not always easy to distinguish between the different types of 
multiple discrimination. This is exacerbated by the fact that the term ‘multiple 
discrimination’ is often used for any of these types and it is not always made clear what 
exactly is meant when a person uses this term. 
 
Before analysing the problems with claims of intersectional discrimination, the 
GendeRace project will be discussed as the findings of this research project can be used 
to illustrate some of the points in the analysis. 
GendeRace Project 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, Middlesex University was involved in the GendeRace 
project, an FP-7 EU funded project which was conducted between February 2008 and 
July 2010 and consisted of research in 6 countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK.12 The objectives of the project were, firstly, to broaden the 
understanding of the impact of gender on the experience of racial or ethnic 
discrimination; and, secondly, to improve the knowledge of the combined effects of 
racial or ethnic and gender discrimination in order to reveal the various forms of 
specific discrimination that women experience. The project also aimed to increase the 
understanding of the impact of gender on the treatment of complaints of racial or ethnic 
discrimination and the use of the law and the institutional framework in these cases. The 
analysis included the testing of key theories concerning the effects of a ground specific 
approach to anti-discrimination legislation on the treatment of multiple discrimination 
cases based on ethnicity and gender. Through all this, the project aimed to develop 
practical tools to assess the effectiveness of policies and practices in the field of anti-
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discrimination in order to take the intersectional dimension of discrimination into 
account. The research was carried out through a study of case law and complaint files, 
and through around 120 semi-directive interviews with victims of discrimination and 60 
interviews with stakeholders, lawyers dealing with discrimination complaints, women 
and minority NGOs, policymakers and social partners. A workshop with stakeholders 
and experts took place in each partner country to discuss the main findings of the 
investigation and to gather policy recommendations. 
 
Some of the key findings of GendeRace project will be discussed here. One important 
finding was that there is a clear impact of gender on the experience of (race or ethnicity) 
discrimination. We found, for example, that men can more easily conceptualise their 
experience as discrimination, while women often feel themselves at fault. Men and 
women also appeared to experience different forms of discrimination, with women more 
often being the victims of harassment or intra-group discrimination – intra-group 
discrimination is discrimination against a person by another person of the same racial or 
ethnic group – and men more commonly facing discrimination in places of recreation 
and leisure. 
 
The research also showed that there are differences between men and women in the way 
they deal with complaints of discrimination. Men tend to lodge complaints more 
frequently than women and they pursue cases further, including in courts and tribunals, 
while women more often settle a case at an earlier stage. The research suggested that 
this is linked to the many barriers in reporting experiences of discrimination, including 
the time which needs to be devoted to pursuing a claim and the emotional toll this 
extracts both from the person pursuing the complaint and their family. This emotional 
toll especially seems to weigh much more heavily on women. The research also found 
that people resorting to a legal remedy when exposed to discrimination primarily 
comprised of citizens of foreign origin with a higher education and in steady 
employment.  
 
That cases of multiple and intersectional discrimination are not identified and treated as 
such was another key finding of the GendeRace research. First of all, despite a tendency 
in the six countries taking part in the project to go over to a single anti-discrimination 
law and a single equality body, both covering all the grounds on which discrimination is 
prohibited in national law, it became clear that the multiple ground approach was still 
rather overlooked by formal and informal bodies or organisations. Victims of multiple 
discrimination themselves also did not often identify their experience as such either. 
Often they would only recognise it when prompted by the interviewer. It was also found 
that there was a very distinct lack of data on multiple discrimination. 
 
It must be pointed out that the advantage of a single anti-discrimination act is that such 
an act is more likely to provide the same protection against discrimination on all 
grounds, although this is not always the case, and this would make a multiple claim 
easier. If different grounds are covered by different acts and the areas covered by these 
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acts are different as well, a claim for multiple discrimination becomes much more 
complicated.  
 
The GendeRace research findings led to a number of recommendations, including the 
harmonisation of the protection against discrimination provided by the EU Equality 
Directives, the incorporation of an explicit reference to multiple discrimination in those 
Directives with a clear operational definition of discrimination and the inclusion of a 
clause allowing complainants to lodge a complaint on several grounds within the 
framework of a single legal procedure. The project also recommended to involve legal 
experts in the development of case law based on multiple discrimination in order to 
influence the legal framework in this area. Awareness of multiple discrimination should 
be raised, not only amongst vulnerable groups, but also amongst advisory and support 
organisations, through the development of cooperation between organisations targeting 
particular groups and equality bodies and through the development of networks for 
multi-ground dialogue. A need to standardise the system for gathering data on 
(multiple) discrimination complaints in the Member States was also one of the 
recommendations.  
 
After this introduction to the GendeRace project and its findings and recommendations, 
the next section will analyse some of the problems that legal systems appear to have 
with dealing with multiple discrimination claims. The GendeRace information will be 
used to illustrate these problems where applicable. 
Problems with dealing with multiple discrimination in law  
 
Above we have briefly mentioned that the advantage of a single anti-discrimination act 
is that such an act is more likely to provide the same protection against discrimination 
on all grounds, with the same definitions of the forms of discrimination applying. Such 
an act is also more likely to protect against all forms of discrimination in the same areas, 
although this is not always the case. Making claims of discrimination on multiple 
grounds would be easier under such an act. If different grounds are covered by different 
acts and the areas covered by these acts are different as well, a claim for multiple 
discrimination becomes much more complicated. The protection provided under EU 




The EU Equality Directives13 have been said to create a hierarchy between 
discrimination grounds, with better protection provided against discrimination on the 
grounds of race and sex than on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and 
sexual orientation.14 The protection against racial and ethnic origin discrimination and 
sex discrimination is stronger because, firstly, Directive 2000/43/EC prohibits racial and 
ethnic origin discrimination in employment related areas; in social protection, including 
social security and healthcare; in social advantages; in education; and, in access to and 
supply of goods and services which are available to the public, including housing.15 Sex 
discrimination in the area of employment and occupation is prohibited by Directive 
2006/54/EC,16 while Directive 2004/113/EC17 prohibits sex discrimination in the access 
to and the supply of goods and services. Discrimination on the grounds of religion or 
belief, disability, age and sexual orientation is, however, only prohibited in the area of 
employment and occupation.18  
 
Another reason why the protection against racial and ethnic origin discrimination and 
against sex discrimination is stronger is that Directives 2000/43/EC, 2004/113/EC and 
2006/54/EC impose a duty on the EU Member States to designate a body or bodies for 
the promotion of equal treatment of all persons without discrimination on the grounds of 
racial or ethnic origin and sex respectively.19 These Directives leave it up to the 
Member States to decide whether they want to create or designate one single body or 
different bodies covering race and sex discrimination. Directive 2000/78/EC does not 
contain any such duty in relation to the grounds of discrimination mentioned in there.  
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These differences lead to two problems with multiple discrimination claims. First, a 
claim for discrimination on a combination of two grounds will not succeed if 
discrimination on one of the grounds claimed is prohibited under the law but the other is 
not. For example, under EU law, an ethnic minority disabled person who is denied 
access to a nightclub because they are both disabled and of an ethnic minority, can 
complain about discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, but not on the 
grounds of disability as Directive 2000/78/EC does not cover this area. The second 
problem is that, if a specialised equality body does not cover both the grounds claimed, 
then a claim to the body or with the assistance of the body will usually only be possible 
on the one ground. For example, if a Member State has established a body for the 
promotion of equal treatment on the ground of racial or ethnic origin, then that body 
will, most likely, only deal with or assist in claims for racial and ethnic origin 
discrimination, whether there is another ground involved or not. And, if a Member State 
has established different equality bodies covering race and sex discrimination, then it 
could very well depend on which body the victim contacts, whether a case is fought on 
the ground of sex or of race discrimination, but neither body is likely to bring a case on 
both grounds. It must be noted, however, that the European Commission, in July 2008, 
has brought out a proposal to extend the material scope of Directive 2000/78/EC to 
bring this in line with the material scope of Directive 2000/43/EC.20 The proposal also 
contains a duty on the Member States to designate bodies covering equal treatment on 
the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. It is left to the 
Member States to decide whether they designate one body or more bodies. However this 
proposal has not been adopted to date. 
 
Therefore, different provisions for different grounds of discrimination could lead to 
problems in dealing with discrimination claims on more than one ground. However, 
although the EU Equality Directives do not impose an obligation on Member States that 
their national law should have any provisions against discrimination on more than one 
ground, they do not appear to prohibit them from providing for this either. But what are 
the problems for the law in dealing with multiple discrimination? 
 
First of all, many national legal systems do not provide for claims of discrimination on 
more than one ground, or can only deal with such cases by looking at and deciding on 
each of the discrimination grounds separately. If a court or tribunal is looking at each 
ground separately, then each ground will have to be proven separately, which increases 
the burden of proof imposed on the complainant. This is called a single ground 
approach to multiple discrimination and this approach could lead to a finding that no 
discrimination has taken place in cases of intersectional discrimination. In the example 
of the older woman applying for a job of driving instructor given above, no 
discrimination on the ground of sex or on the ground of age could be proven or would 
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be found, and thus a finding of discrimination could only be established if the court 
could take the combination of the two grounds into account. In that case, being able to 
claim on more than one ground would be the only chance of making a successful claim. 
And, in the above mentioned case of the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission regarding 
the blind, ethnic minority job applicant, the Commission looked at each ground, 
disability and race, separately, suggesting that it dealt with the case as a case of additive 
or compound discrimination rather than intersectional discrimination. In cases where the 
first or second type of multiple discrimination we distinguished above occurs, the 
grounds can be looked at separately, but in a case of intersectional discrimination this is 
often not possible as shown with the example of the driving instructor. The increase in 
the burden of proof represents a problem for multiple discrimination cases of all three 
types. 
 
But why do most national anti-discrimination laws in the EU Member States deal with 
claims on multiple grounds in this way? It is suggested that part of the reason might be 
that the definitions of both direct and indirect discrimination, under the EU Equality 
Directives as well as in many national anti-discrimination laws, depend on a 
comparator: according to EU law, direct discrimination takes place where one person is 
treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable 
situation. Indirect discrimination is taken to occur where an apparently neutral 
provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a particular characteristic at a 
particular disadvantage compared to other persons [my italics]. The comparison that 
must be made, even though the use of a hypothetical comparator is allowed, makes a 
claim on more than one ground more difficult, because the more grounds applicable, the 
more complicated it becomes to choose a comparator. For example, who should be the 
comparator for an ethnic minority, lesbian, disabled, Muslim, retired woman? Do you 
compare her with a white, heterosexual, able-bodied, non-Muslim, non-retired man?  
 
There is also the problem that victims of (multiple) discrimination do not recognise 
what has happened to them as such. They might not even realise that they have been 
discriminated against, let alone that they have been discriminated against on more than 
one ground, as was found in the GendeRace research. If victims of discrimination 
recognise their treatment as such and decide to seek advice from an equality body or 
other advice organisation, sometimes it depends on the body or organisation which 
ground will be pursued, as was already mentioned above. If it is an organisation 
working for sex equality, for example, then the case is likely to be taken on the ground 
of sex discrimination, even if another ground is recognised. And, even if a victim seeks 
advice from a body dealing with all grounds of discrimination covered by the national 
legislation, the advisor, even if they recognise that different grounds are at play, will 
often make a strategic decision as to which ground to pursue: the ground they think is 
strongest and which can be proven most easily and which is thus most likely to lead to a 
finding of discrimination. Claiming more grounds means making matters more 
complicated and increases the burden of proof. Although, as seen above, in some cases 
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only claiming one ground would not lead to a finding of discrimination and, in those 
cases, the taking cases on more than one grounds increases the chances of success. 
Problems with a single ground approach 
 
The single ground approach in dealing with multiple discrimination based on a list of 
grounds of discrimination enumerated in the anti-discrimination legislation, thus 
appears to be the most common approach in all the countries involved in the GendeRace 
project and in many other European countries. But why is such a single ground 
approach seen as problematic? Is a finding of discrimination, even if it is only on a 
single ground, not enough? A number of points of criticism, all interlinked and 
overlapping, can be brought forward against this single ground approach to cases where 
multiple grounds are present.21 
 
Firstly, listing the grounds of discrimination tends to emphasise differences between 
people and exacerbates the tendency to see others as different. For example, a Muslim 
person claims discrimination on the ground of religion because he is treated less 
favourably than a non-Muslim person. This emphasises the difference between these 
two people and sets the Muslim person apart from other persons. Related to this is the 
fact that this approach presumes that categories can be easily drawn, that there are clear 
distinctions between the categories protected by the law and that each ground can be 
looked at in isolation. In practice, the distinctions are not always clear and this is 
exacerbated by the fact that some categories are often socially constructed (like race). 
For example, the GendeRace research found that discrimination against women who 
wear the hijab or Islamic headscarf took place in several countries, while Muslim or 
Arabic or ‘foreign-looking’ men were often denied access to places like nightclubs. Is 
this because of religion, racial or ethnic origin or even nationality? And in both cases 
sex was an issue as well. The problem is acerbated by the fact that perpetrators of 
discrimination often do not make distinctions either: they might discriminate because 
someone wears a turban, and thus is of foreign origin and probably a (Muslim) terrorist. 
 
Secondly, one social characteristic becomes dominant and the others become invisible. 
The approach also tends to promote an essentialist understanding of identity and 
presumes that the ‘self’ has an essence which is rather unchangeable over time. In 
reality, for most people the traits that define them are multiple and they will emphasise 
different traits at different times. Moreover, the traits that define them can change over 
time. This is especially clear for traits like age, disability and religion. 
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A third point of criticism is that the approach can also lead to exclusionary tendencies: 
groups form around a single ground and are only interested in promoting provisions 
dealing with that ground. This tends to polarise groups, but it also assumes homogeneity 
within groups and does not give any attention to differences between individuals within 
the group. The GendeRace research found that intra-group discrimination takes place 
with a certain frequency as well. A single ground approach often also assumes that 
groups are mutually exclusive while, in reality, people can belong to a number of 
different groups at the same time. 
 
Lastly, but most importantly, all these factors suggest that a single ground approach to 
dealing with multiple discrimination cases does not recognise the unique situation of the 
victim; it does not recognise his or her whole identity with all its different traits. It 
forces claimants to choose between the multiple elements that make up their identity. 
People who file discrimination complaints are not always looking for financial or other 
compensation. They often just want acknowledgement that they were indeed victims of 
discrimination. They want recognition of what they are and of the fact that they are 
discriminated against because of what they are. They might lose a case because there is 
no discrimination on either one of the single grounds complained about as in the above 
mentioned example of the older woman who applied for a job as a driving instructor. 
But, even if they win a case fought on a single ground, they might not feel satisfied 
because there will not be any real acknowledgement by the court or tribunal that what 
factually happened was discriminatory. They might feel that they have obtained an 
opinion on something that has not happened in the way it was described in the court at 
all.  
 
A good example of the latter is the British case of Miriam O’Reilly who claimed sex 
and age discrimination against the BBC.22 In this case it seemed clear to many, not only 
in the academic world but also in the media, that discrimination had taken place on the 
combined grounds of sex and age. However, the Employment Tribunal only found age 
discrimination. Ms O’Reilly had been the presenter on the BBC programme ‘Country 
file’ for a number of years, but was then dropped when the programme moved to a 
different, more prime time, evening slot and she was replaced by a younger presenter.  
 
The Employment Tribunal in this case found age discrimination as they thought she 
would have been considered for the presenter’s job if she had been 10 to 15 years 
younger. However, they did not accept sex discrimination, as, in their view, an older 
man would have been treated in the same way. The Employment Tribunal stated that 
‘we do not doubt that older women have faced particular disadvantage within the 
broadcast media’.23 They continued: ‘while we conclude that age was a factor in the 
                                                 
 
22
 Miriam O’Reilly v British Broadcasting Corporation, Case Number 2200423/2010, 11 January 2011, 
available on line at:  http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/oreilly-bbc.pdf  
23
 Ibid, at para. 292. 
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final choice of presenters, we do not accept that this particular decision involved 
combined age and sex discrimination or sex discrimination in addition to age 
discrimination’.24 However, the latter appears to be doubtful, considering that John 
Craven, who is over 70 years old, is a regular presenter on the programme and 
considering the amount of older male presenters in all type of BBC and other broadcast 
companies’ programmes. The Employment Tribunal accepted that ‘older women have 
faced particular disadvantage within the broadcast media’, but then concluded that an 
older man would have been treated in the same way, which seems contradictory. In the 
UK, there have also been other incidents concerning older female television presenters 
and news readers who lost their job, which have been widely discussed in the media and 
which raised the issue that there appears to be a culture within the BBC (and other 
British broadcasting companies) which treats older male and older female presenters 
differently.25 None of these other cases were taken to tribunals.  
 
Therefore, Ms O’Reilly won her case on the age discrimination ground but not on the 
combined grounds of age and sex. This might not have been very satisfactory for her, as 
she, and many others, appeared to see this clearly as a case based on the combination of 
the grounds of age and sex, and this was not recognised by the Employment Tribunal. 
The finding of age discrimination by the Tribunal does not seem to reflect what really 
took place in practice. In cases of discrimination on intersectional grounds, the 
discrimination experienced is different from that experienced on any individual ground 
and this is not recognised by the courts in a single ground approach to cases of multiple 
discrimination. However, from some of the interviews for the GendeRace project with 
legal experts and discrimination advisers, this appears not to be a problem in that many 
discrimination cases. According to these interviewees, often people do not seem to care 
too much about this recognition and they are more worried about practical things, like 
getting a good job reference which will help in finding another job. 
 
So the single ground approach in dealing with multiple discrimination claims used in 
the GendeRace partner countries and most other European countries has been criticised 
for a number of reasons. But this raises the question whether there are any alternative 
ways to address intersectional discrimination? The next part will look at this. 
Ways to address multiple discrimination/examples of good practice 
 
The anti-discrimination legislation, both at national and at European level, could allow 
for a claim to be made on more than one ground of discrimination and allow for a 
comparison to be made taking into account more than one ground. It is suggested that 
the most effective way to achieve protection against multiple and intersectional 
                                                 
 
24
 Ibid. at para. 300. 
25
 See on this: Plunkett, J. (2011), Country file’s Miriam O'Reilly wins BBC Ageism Claim, available on 
line at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/jan/11/countryfile-miriam-oreilly-tribunal and the links to 
other articles on this web page. 
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discrimination across the EU would be action in a EU directive along the lines of the 
recommendations of the GendeRace project - harmonisation of protection against 
discrimination against all grounds covered by EU anti-discrimination law, an explicit 
reference to multiple discrimination in the equality directives with a clear operational 
definition of discrimination, and the inclusion of a clause allowing a discrimination 
complaint to be made on several grounds at the same time. The adoption of the 
proposed new directive26 would be a step in this direction as it levels up the protection 
against discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual 
orientation to all the areas covered by Directive 2000/43/EC. If provisions against 
multiple discrimination were laid down in a EU Directive, all Member States would 
have to implement these. 
 
Section 14 of the British Equality Act 2010 could function as an example of a multiple 
discrimination provision laid down in an anti-discrimination act and was given as an 
example of good practice by the GendeRace project. In Britain, a new Equality Act was 
adopted in 2010, and this act provided in a single act protection against discrimination 
on all the grounds previously covered by a number of different acts and regulations. 
When this Act, referred to as the Equality Act 2010, came out, a provision for 
‘combined discrimination: dual characteristics’ was made in Section 14, which 
determined that a person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a 
combination of two relevant, protected characteristics, A treats B less favourably than A 
treats or would treat a person who does not share either of those characteristics. 
Therefore, a claim could be made for multiple or intersectional discrimination, for 
discrimination on a combination of grounds, but only claims of direct discrimination 
and only claims on a combination of two grounds were allowed. There was no 
possibility of making a claim on more than two grounds under this Section 14. The 
British Government gave two reasons for these limitations. The first reason was that the 
legislation would become too complicated if claims for discrimination on three or more 
grounds were to be allowed and that this would make it more difficult for businesses 
and employers to know how to avoid discrimination; the second reason for the 
limitation was that it had become clear, from the previous consultation, that providing 
for a combination of two grounds together would be enough in the vast majority of 
cases.27  
 
A claim for dual discrimination under Section 14 would only be possible if 
discrimination on both grounds is prohibited in the relevant area under the Act. No 
specific provisions in relation to the burden of proof or evidence in dual discrimination 
cases were made in the Act and, with regard to the comparator, the Government 
consultation document explained that courts and tribunals could continue to use either 
actual or hypothetical comparators when considering multiple discrimination claims. 
                                                 
 
26
 COM (2008) 426, supra note 20. 
27
 Government Equalities Office, supra note 10, at 9, point 2.7; at 15, point 4.6 and at 16, 4.9 and 4.10. . 
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The comparator would be someone who does not have either of the protected 
characteristics.28 The section would thus still require a comparison to be made, 
although, in line with EU law, a hypothetical comparator would be accepted.  
 
 If a court or tribunal should find in favour of the claimant in a multiple discrimination 
claim, compensation and damages would be calculated in the same manner as for 
single-strand claims of discrimination based on actual loss and injury to feeling. There 
was no provision for aggravated damages or increased compensation for multiple 
discrimination.29 As the British equality body, the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, covers all grounds of discrimination which fall under the Act, there would 
be no problem in them dealing with cases on a combination of two grounds. 
 
Despite the limitation to direct discrimination and to claims on a combination of two 
grounds only, Section 14 of the Equality Act 2010 would thus provide a solution for 
cases where a combination of two grounds of discrimination is present but 
discrimination cannot be proven on either ground, and it would give the victim a 
remedy where he/she does not have one now. It would thus help victims like the older 
woman who wanted to be a driving instructor in the example mentioned above. 
However, this Section of the Equality Act 2010 did not come into force when most of 
the other parts of the Act came into force in October 2010 and it was said at that time 
that the coming into force of this section was still being discussed within the 
Government. In the April 2011 budget, the Government announced, in a very short 
paragraph, that this section will not be brought into force at all, as part of its actions to 
reduce regulations which have a disproportionate cost on business.30 Therefore, the 
section will not become law. However, it can still be seen as an example of how law 
could deal with multiple discrimination.  
 
Another way of providing for multiple discrimination in anti-discrimination legislation, 
which goes beyond the limited provisions in the British Equality Act 2010 described 
above, can be found in the amendments suggested by the European Parliament in 
relation to the proposal for the new directive31 which extends the protection against 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation 
outside the employment field to all areas covered by Directive 2000/43/EC.32 The 
Parliament has suggested to change Article 1 of the proposed Directive to read: ‘this 
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 Ibid. at 18, points 4.16 and 4.17. 
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 Ibid. at 21, point 5.8. 
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 See on this: HM Treasury, Budget 2011, pages 28-29, points 1.81, available on line at: http://cdn.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/2011budget_complete.pdf  
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 COM (2008) 426, supra note 20. 
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 European Parliament P6_TA-PROV(2009)0211, European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 2 
April 2009 on the Proposal for a Council Directive implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment 
between Person irrespective of Religion or Belief, Disability, Age or Sexual Orientation (COM 
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Directive lays down a framework for combating discrimination, including multiple 
discrimination, on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation, 
with a view to putting into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment 
other than in the field of employment and occupation’. The suggested Amendment then 
describes that multiple discrimination occurs when discrimination is based on a 
combination of any of two or more of the grounds covered by Article 19 TFEU (sex, 
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation) and 
nationality.33  
 
The Parliament also proposes that the definition of direct discrimination should read: 
‘direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person, or persons who are or 
who are assumed to be associated with such a person, is treated less favourably than 
another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on one or more of the 
grounds [my emphasis] referred to in Article 1’.34 Both these amendments could be 
transferred into the other EU Equality Directives (2000/43/EC; 2000/78/EC; 
2004/133/EC and 2006/54/EC). The advantage of having an explicit provision at EU 
level has already been pointed out: all EU Member States would have to implement the 
Directive and thus provide for protection against multiple discrimination. However, 
even if the EU would not provide for this, the Member States could still use the 
Parliament’s proposed amendments as an example for laying down protection against 
multiple discrimination in their national laws. However, the amendments suggested by 
the European Parliament would also, like Section 14 of the British Equality Act 2010, 
still leave the requirement for a (real or hypothetical) comparator in place.  
 
Despite the interest shown within the EU institutions, the EU does not appear to be 
planning to provide for multiple discrimination. In the explanatory memorandum to 
COM (2008) 426, the Commission reports that, in its consultation, attention was drawn 
to the need to tackle multiple discrimination, for example by defining it as 
discrimination and by providing effective remedies. It then states: ‘These issues go 
beyond the scope of this directive but nothing prevents Member States taking action in 
these areas’.35 In other words, the EU will not provide for this and it is left to the 
Member States to do so. However, not many Member States have actual provided for 
the taking of cases on multiple grounds to date.  
 
An example of a Member State’s national law which does already provide for multiple 
discrimination can be found in Article 18(3) and (4) of the Labour Code of Poland.36 
                                                 
 
33
 Ibid. Amendment 37. 
34
 Ibid. Amendment 38. 
35
 COM (2008) 426, supra note 20, at 4. 
36
 For example, Article 18(4) of the Labour code defines’ indirect discrimination’ as follows: ‘Indirect 
discrimination occurs whenever an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice results in 
differences in terms of employment to the detriment of all or a substantial number of employees belonging 
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And, the Bulgarian Anti-discrimination Law defines multiple discrimination as 
‘discrimination on the grounds of more than one of the characteristics under Article 
4(1)’.37  
 
Evidence that discrimination occurred on more than one ground could also be seen as an 
aggravating circumstance or factor which can give rise to the award of a higher sum in 
compensation. Austria, Italy and Romania, for example, have provided for multiple 
discrimination to be taken into account when calculating compensation.38 
 
Another example the EU Member States could use is the Canadian Human Rights Act, 
which was amended in 1998 and now includes a section, Section 3(1) under the heading 
‘multiple grounds of discrimination’, which states:  
For greater certainty, a discriminatory practice includes a practice based on one or 
more prohibited grounds of discrimination or on the effect of a combination of 
prohibited grounds.39  
This approach deals with some of the points of criticism made against the single ground 
approach. As Moon writes: 
The great merit of this approach is that it has permitted the particular experience of 
the individual to be acknowledged and so remedied. The Ontario Human Rights 
Commission has noted that taking an intersectional approach leads to a greater 
focus on society’s response to the individual and a lesser focus on the category into 
which the person may fit. This enables a Court to make a more person-specific 
analysis of the effect of the treatment in question.40 
This would thus put more emphasis on the individual’s experience. 
 
The approach of the South African Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 2000 might also be more suited than other equality regimes to tackle 
multiple discrimination. This Act determines that neither the State nor any person may 
unfairly discriminate against any person (Section 6). Discrimination is defined in 
Section 1(1)(viii) as meaning  
                                                                                                                                               
 
to a group differentiated with regard to one or more reasons mentioned in § 1, and if they cannot be 
objectively justified by other reasons’. 
37
 Final Report GendeRace Project, supra note 1, at 202. 
38
 Burri and Schiek, supra note 6, at 17. 
39
 See on this for example: Schiek, D. (2005) ‘Broadening the Scope and the Norms of EU Gender 
Equality Law: Towards a Multidimensional Conception of Equality Law’ 12, 4 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 457-459; and, Moon, G. (2011) ‘Justice for the Whole Person: the UK’s 
Partial Success Story’ in: Schiek and Lawson, supra note 2, 162-163. See on the treatment of 
intersectional and multiple discrimination in Canada more generally: Grabham, E. (2002) ‘Law v Canada: 
New Directions under the Canadian Charter?’ 22, 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 641-661; McColgan, 
supra note 21, at 87-90; and, the report by the European Commission mentioned supra note 5, at 25-26. 
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any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation 
which directly or indirectly (a) imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantages on; 
or (b) withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from, any person on one or 
more of the prohibited grounds. 
Section 1(1) (xxii) mentions, in paragraph (a) a number of prohibited grounds,41 and 
then adds:  
or any other ground where discrimination based on that other ground 
(i) causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage; 
(ii) undermines human dignity; or 
(iii) adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a person’s rights and freedoms in 
a serious manner that is comparable to discrimination on a ground in 
paragraph (a); 
 
This South-African Act thus outlaws discrimination on a expansive list of grounds and 
also on any other ground where discrimination on that ground causes or perpetuates 
systemic disadvantage or undermines human dignity. The focus of the analysis therefore 
rests on the effect of the treatment on the individual. This is confirmed by Section 14 of 
the Act, which determines what needs to be taken into account to establish whether the 
discrimination was unfair or not and this includes whether the discrimination impairs or 
is likely to impair human dignity and the impact or likely impact of the discrimination 
on the complainant.42 The South African approach is thus able to address any ground or 
combination of grounds howsoever defined by the claimant, so long as it can be shown 
to constitute a marker of disadvantage or undermines human dignity and a person’s 
sense of self.  
 
Going back to what was said earlier about what victims want when they make a claim 
for discrimination: they want recognition of what they are, of their whole identity, with 
all the characteristics that make up what they are. They want recognition that what they 
have experienced is discrimination because of what they are. The Canadian and the 
South-African approaches appear to be better suited to give the victim this recognition. 
The South-African approach is especially well suited to deal with intersectional 
discrimination, because it looks at the effect of the treatment on the individual. The 
focus in the South-African Act on treatment which perpetuates systemic disadvantage 
and/or undermines human dignity whether this is based on one or more discrimination 
grounds makes this approach much more suitable to deal with claims which satisfy the 
victim as it acknowledges what factually happened and that the discrimination took 
place because of what they are with all their traits or characteristics. 
                                                 
 
41
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National institutional provisions for dealing with discrimination could play a role in 
dealing with multiple discrimination claims as well. It was already noted that the 
existence of a single equality body which deals with all grounds of discrimination 
covered by the anti-discrimination law could make it easier for victims to find advice 
and assistance in multiple discrimination complaints. The existence of a number of 
different bodies covering different grounds could make it very difficult for a victim of 
multiple discrimination to find help in bringing a claim. There appears to be a tendency 
in quite a few of the EU Member States to establish or to change over to single bodies.43 
In the GendeRace partner countries, Bulgaria, France and Germany already had a single 
equality body and Sweden and the UK recently created one. Sweden had four different 
ombudsmen to monitor and combat discrimination on different grounds (ethnicity, 
disability, gender and sexual orientation) which merged in January 2009. The UK 
Equality and Human Rights Commission took over the tasks of three different 
commission existing before then (for race, gender and disability). It started its work in 
October 2007 with a remit which was extended to include all the grounds on which 
discrimination is prohibited in British law as well as human rights. Both Sweden and the 




This paper has pointed out that the term multiple discrimination is used for a number of 
different types of cases where more than one ground of discrimination is present, often 
without a clear indication of what is meant by the term. Three types were distinguished: 
intersectional discrimination, additive discrimination and multiple discrimination (used 
in a narrow sense).   
 
After discussing the GendeRace project and some of its findings, the problems of 
dealing with multiple discrimination in law were discussed. Although EU anti-
discrimination law does not impose an obligation on the Member States to provides for 
claims of discrimination on more than one ground, it does not appear to prohibit them 
from doing so either. However, the problem with EU law is that the protection provided 
against discrimination differs for the different grounds of discrimination. This makes it 
more difficult to claim on more than one ground under EU law.  
 
One of the main difficulties in many of the EU Member States is also that the law does 
not provide for multiple ground claims and that the courts use a single ground approach, 
where each ground is looked at separately and each ground thus has to be proven 
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separately. This approach has been criticised for a number of reasons, the main one 
being that such an approach does not recognise the unique situation of the victim and 
their whole identity with all its different traits.  
 
A number of ways to address multiple discrimination in law were suggested, including 
some examples of national law and the proposed amendments of the EU Parliament to 
the Proposal for a new EU Directive. Two examples of legislative provisions, in Canada 
and in South Africa, were given which would make claims for multiple discrimination 
easier because they focus particularly on the individual victim and the effect of the 
treatment on him or her.  
 
The GendeRace research suggested that there are some signs of the development of 
awareness of multiple and intersectional discrimination at national level as well as at the 
EU level. The project and my own research activities during and since that project, 
suggest that the issue of multiple discrimination has come to the fore in countries where 
the anti-discrimination law has been in existence for a certain amount of time. In those 
countries, the law has settled and developed and issues of discrimination have become 
more generally known. The thinking in these countries about equality and non-
discrimination has evolved towards considering equality objectives which go beyond 
mere equal treatment. In contrast, in countries where anti-discrimination laws are 
relatively new, the first priority appears to be to establish the law and deal with 
discrimination or unequal treatment as such, rather than looking beyond this and 
complicate things further by looking at discrimination on two or more grounds at the 
same time. With the many different stages of development of anti-discrimination law in 
the EU Member States, maybe it is too much to expect the EU to take the lead in 
providing for multiple discrimination. However, a provision by the EU would be the 
only way to ensure that multiple and intersectional discrimination would be provided for 
in the anti-discrimination legislation of all EU Member States. 
